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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of the circuit court was established pursuant to § 78-4-7 Utah Code
Ann., and 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d). The jurisdiction of this Court is established pursuant to
§ 78-2a-3(2)(d) and 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

(Respecting Both Parts of This Two-Part Appeal - (Part A and Part B))
ISSUE NO. 1: Did the circuit court err by restricting the time for trial and thereby
deprive Defendant of fundamental due process under section one of the fourteenth
amendment to the U. S. Constitution, and Article I, section 7, of the Constitution of the
State of Utah?
(Respecting Part A)
ISSUE NO. 2: Did the circuit court err in granting judgment to Plaintiff where
Defendant had previously raised, in her amended Answer pleadings pursuant to Rule 8(c),
U.R.C.P., the affirmative defense that Plaintiffs claims were stale and thus barred by the
doctrine of waiver, laches, and estoppel?
ISSUE NO. 3: Did the circuit court err by denying Defendant equal protection under
the law where it awarded assignee Plaintiff the benefit of interest pursuant to Assignor's
contract while precluding Defendant from calculating like interest amounts pursuant to her
unambiguous contract upon which Assignor had previously defaulted, in order to obtain
an equal, or greater, offset against assignee Plaintiffs claims as provided pursuant to Rule
13(c), U.R.C.P.?
ISSUE NO, 4: Did the circuit court err in granting judgment to Plaintiff where it
calculated Plaintiffs claims by relying on defense exhibit incorporating Assignor's unproven
amounts in light of finding that Plaintiffs case suffered from lack of adequate evidence in
the record?

(Respecting Part B)
ISSUE NO. 5: Did the circuit cottrt err by finding that Defendant had failed to prove,
"by a preponderance of the evidence," that she had a cause of action pursuant to the
FDCPA and the UCSPA where she was precluded from prosecuting her claims thereunder
as the proximate result of the time restraints imposed for trial?
STATEMENT OF I H E CASE

This case arises from events commencing in early 1982 when Plaintiffs Assignor
("Assignor" or "Creditor") defaulted on an equipment purchase contract with Defendant
("Defendant's Contract"). Thereafter, Defendant offered to trade amounts in default for
dental services in lieu of payment by Assignor and a verbal agreement was struck. During
Defendant's treatment more extensive procedures were required which necessitated direct
negotiations between Assignor and Defendant's insurance carrier. These entities, upon
completion of negotiations, represented to Defendant that they "had agreed" as to the
estimated costs of treatment but neither entity disclosed the substance of these negotiations
to Defendant then or thereafter. Defendant's dental treatment was completed in 1984 and
Assignor submitted a statement for the purported balance due. Assignor's statement failed
to reflect credit for the prior default amounts and numerous insurance benefit payments.
Thereupon a dispute arose between the Parties. In 1991, Assignor assigned the purported
balance due to Plaintiff, a third-party collection agency, to effect collection thereof. During
the course of collection attempts, Plaintiff committed various acts which Defendant asserts
to be in violation of both the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq,,
and the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act § 13-11-1 et seq,, Utah Code Ann. Plaintiff
instituted this action in 1992. Defendant originally answered proper and denied Plaintiffs
allegations. Thereafter, Defendant retained counsel and obtained leave to file an amended
answer and add a counterclaim. After various motions and two pretrial conferences, trial
B R I E F O F A P P F I I AKIT - PArsF s>

was held in December 1994 and judgment was rendered for Plaintiff. Defendant objected
to Plaintiffs post-trial submission of findings of fact and conclusions of law and judgment
on the grounds of manifest error.
On 5 May 1995, another hearing was held in an attempt to resolve this post-trial
dispute, whereupon a final Order was entered reflecting the provisions of revised findings
and conclusions. From that Judgment this two-part appeal is now taken.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

The facts set forth in Part A of this appeal deal solely with matters regarding the
claims in Plaintiffs complaint and Defendant's defenses and counterclaims thereto. Part
B hereof deals with the subject matter of Defendant's counterclaim which seeks relief for
Plaintiffs alleged violations of the FDCPA which, in turn, give rise to additional pendent
claims under the UCSPA. Although the claims under both Part A and Part B necessarily
arise from the same disputed transactions, the two Parts bear no logical relationship to each
other.1 With respect to Part A, the facts date from Assignor's default on Defendant's
Contract for postage and mailing equipment, executed 31 March 1982, and subsequent
events related thereto. These events eventually culminated in Assignor's assigning to
Plaintiff the alleged debt purported to be owed by Defendant and ultimately resulted in
the instant litigation now on appeal here. With respect to Part B, the facts stem from
Plaintiffs initial communication to Defendant, dated 8 May 1991, as a third-party debt
collector, and events transpiring thereafter, all of which Defendant alleges violated the

1

See Peterson v. United Accounts, Inc., 638 F.2d 1134,1137 (8th Cir., 1981) (While the
debt claim and the FDCPA counterclaim raised here may, in a technical sense, arise from
the same...transaction, the two claims bear no logical relation to one another. Although
there is some overlap of issues raised in both cases as a result of the defenses raised in the
state action, the suit on the debt brought in state court is not logically related to the federal
action initiated to enforce federal policy regulating the practices for the collection of such
debts).
Oi-kii— i— +-\rr
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FDCPA and give rise to the additional protections afforded pursuant to the UCSPA. This
two-part appeal raises five (5) principal issues for review by this Court. The first issue
relates to both Part A and Part B. Issues #2 through #4, inclusive, relate to Part A only,
while Issue #5 relates solely to Part B.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

ISSUE NO. 1: Did the circuit court err by restricting the time for trial and thereby
deprive Defendant of fundamental due process under section one of the fourteenth
amendment to the U. S. Constitution, and Article I, section 7, of the Constitution of the
State of Utah? This question presents a conclusion of law which the Court of Appeals
reviews for correctness. United Park City Mines v. Greater Park City Co., 870 P. 2d 880, 885
(Utah, 1993); Society of Separationists, Inc. v. Taggart, 862 P.2d 1339, 1341 (Utah, 1993);
McMahan v. Bees, 873 P.2d 1172, 1175 (Ut.Ct.App., 1994); Wade v. Stangl 869 P.2d 9,12
(Ut.Ct.App., 1994). Appellate courts have the ultimate power to conduct an independent
review of federal constitutional claims. City of St George v. Turner, 860 P.2d 929, 932
(Utah, 1993) (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 2615, 37 L.Ed.2d 419
[1973]).
RESPECTING PART A

ISSUE NO. 2: Did the circuit court err in granting judgment to Plaintiff where
Defendant had previously raised, in her amended Answer pleadings pursuant to Rule 8(c)
U.R.C.P., the affirmative defense that Plaintiffs claims were stale and thus barred by the
doctrine of waiver, laches, and estoppel? This issue, likewise, presents a conclusion of law
which the Court of Appeals reviews for correctness. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah
1994); Provo River Water Users'Ass'n. v. Morgan, 857 P.2d 927, 931 (Utah 1993); Higgins
v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993); Klinger v. Kightlv, 791 P.2d 868, 870
(Utah 1990); Scharfv. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985); Sew v. Security Title
B R I E F O F A P P F L L A M T - PA<-SF -d.

Co, 857 P.2d 958, 961 (Ut.Ct.App., 1993), cert, granted, 870 P.2d 957 (Utah 1994). This
standard has also been referred to as a "correction of error standard." Jacobsen Inv. Co. v.
State Tax Common., 839 P.2d 789, 790 (Utah 1992); Sanders v. Ovard, 838 P.2d 1134,1135
(Utah 1992); Commercial Union Assocs. v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 29, 36 (Ut.Ct.App., 1993).
With regard to the issue of laches, see Papanikolas Brothers Enterprises v. Sugarhouse
Shopping Center Associates, 535 P.2d 1256,1260 (Utah 1975). Cited in Leaver v. Grose, 610
P.2d 1262,1264, n. 2 (Utah 1980); Plateau Mining Company v. Utah Division of State Lands
and Forestry, et at, 802 P.2d 720,731 (Utah 1990); Sandy City v. SaltLake County, 827 P.2d
227, 230, n. 5 (Utah 1992).
ISSUE NCX 3: Did the circuit court err by denying Defendant equal protection under
the law where it awarded assignee Plaintiff the benefit of interest pursuant to Assignor's
contract while precluding Defendant from calculating like interest amounts pursuant to her
unambiguous contract upon which Assignor had previously defaulted, in order to obtain
an equal, or greater, offset against assignee Plaintiffs claims as provided pursuant to Rule
13(c), U.R.C.P.? This issue presents a conclusion of law and is reviewable by the Court of
Appeals for correctness as cited in the authorities in Issues No. 1 and 3, above. For
authorities deciding whether the court properly interpreted an unambiguous contact, see:
Saunders v.Sharp, 806 P.2d 198,199-200 (Utah 1991); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut Ins.
Group, 868 P.2d 110,112 (Ut.Ct.App., 1994); Edwards &Daniels Architects, Inc. v. Farmers9
Properties, Inc., 865 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Ut.Ct.App., 1993); LMV Leasing, Inc. v. Conlin, 805
P.2d 189, 192 (Ut.Ct.App., 1991).
ISSUE NO. 4: Did the circuit court err in granting judgment to Plaintiff where it
calculated Plaintiffs claims by relying on defense exhibit incorporating Assignor's unproven
amounts in light of finding that Plaintiffs case suffered from lack of adequate evidence in
the record? This issue presents a conclusion of law and is reviewable by the Court of

Appeals for correction of the court's calculations as cited in the authorities set forth in
Issues No. 1 and 3, above.
RESPECTING PART B

ISSUE NO. 5: Did the circuit court err by finding that Defendant had failed to prove,
,f

by a preponderance of the evidence/' that she had a cause of action pursuant to the

FDCPA and the UCSPA where she was precluded from prosecuting her claims thereunder
as the proximate result of the time restraints imposed for trial? This issue presents a
question of fact which is reviewable under the clearly erroneous standard. See Western
Capital & Sees., Inc. v. Knudsvig, 768 P.2d 989 (Ut.Ct.App.), cert, denied, 779 P.2d 688
(Utah 1989) (Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if the appellant can show that they are
without adequate evidentiary foundation or if they are induced by an erroneous view of
the law); Maughnv.Maughn,

770 P.2d 156 (Ut.Ct.App., 1989); Monroe, Inc. v. Sidwell, 770

P.2d 1022 (Ut.Ct.App., 1989); Weston v. Weston, 773 P.2d 408 (Ut.Ct.App., 1989); Butler v.
Lee, 774 P.2d 1150 (Ut.Ct.App., 1989) (Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if it can be
shown that they are against the clear weight of evidence or that they induce a definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been made). Whether a statute applies to a particular
set of facts is a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. State v. Waite, 803 P.2d
1279, 1282 (Ut.Ct.App., 1993).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The First Issue presented herein relates to the entirety of both Part A and Part B of
this two-part appeal. It presents a substantive due process question which arises from the
circuit court's untimely restriction placed upon the time for trial, which restriction
Defendant argues precluded her from her rightful day in court, thus operating to prohibit
her from fully prosecuting her defenses and counterclaims. Issues two through four,
inclusive, deal solely with questions arising under Part A regarding the subject matter of

Plaintiffs complaint while under Part B the fifth issue deals with Defendant's
counterclaims under the FDCPA and UCSPA. The Second Issue in this appeal presents
the question of whether Plaintiffs claims were barred by laches owing to Assignor's lack
of diligence in prosecuting its alleged claims and the subsequent loss of relevant evidence
resulting from the inordinate lapse of time and inadequate record-keeping, rendering such
evidence unavailable, together with unavailability of a material witness having first-hand
knowledge of the facts from the outset, and argues that this affirmative defense is
preserved on appeal where it is contained in Defendants's amended answer and
counterclaim pleadings. The Third Issue presents the question of whether the circuit court
erred in granting judgment in favor of Plaintiff where it relied upon clearly erroneous
amounts contained in billing statements previously mailed to Defendant by Assignor,
thereby determining, as the basis for its calculations, an amount exceeding the relief sought
in Plaintiffs complaint by more than $1,350.00. The Fourth Issue presents the question of
whether the circuit court erred by denying Defendant equal protection pursuant to the
express terms of her contract upon which Assignor had previously defaulted, and argues
on appeal that the court erred by excluding Defendant's contract from being published and
that Defendant was thereby precluded from the benefit of interest due thereunder in
calculating her offset against Plaintiffs claims while Plaintiff was awarded interest
pursuant to its contract with Defendant — both contracts providing for equal rates of
interest. Lastly, the Fifth Issue, pursuant to Part B, presents the question of whether the
circuit court erred by summarily concluding, as a matter of law, that Defendant had failed
to meet her burden of proof "by a preponderance of the evidence" establishing that she had
a cause of action pursuant to the FDCPA and the UCSPA in light of the fact that the
untimely restriction of time for trial effectively precluded her from fully prosecuting her
claims through direct examination of witnesses on such issues, and argues that the court's

request for Counsel to simply provide it with a cursory "Reader's Digest" version of the
substantive matter thereof manifestly violated the letter and spirit of clear congressional
and state legislative intent under both Acts as established by well settled decisional law.
ARGUMENT

(Respecting Both Part A and Part B)
ISSUE #1: Did the circuit court err by restricting the time for trial and thereby
deprive Defendant of fundamental due process under section one of the fourteenth
amendment to the U. SL Constitution, and Article I, section 7, of the Constitution of the
State of Utah?
At two (2) pretrial conferences held during the protracted litigation of this case,2 and
on no less than six (6) separate instances thereat the court below plainly stated that the
Parties would be allowed a half-day for trial, or reasonably thereabout, to try the issues in
controversy. Addressing Defendant's counsel in this regard, the court first stated as
follows:
"I'm going to indicate to you that Pm going to give your client absolutely
the day in court to which any litigant is entitled." (P.T., 10 Dec. 1993, page
5, lines 10-12.)3
Later in this pretrial conference the court again stated:
"This is the kind of case that really should take no longer than a half a day."
(P.T., at p. 13, lines 12-13. Ibid.)
And finally, the court concluded by expressing its willingness to accommodate the Parties'
respective schedules and, inquiring as to the fairness of its detemiination in this regard,
stated as follows:
"Now please understand when I said 111 accommodate your schedule, I go
to Summit County and handle two courts up there. I am also locked into
circuit prelim dates and generally I have to get filed — generally a Friday,
2
3

Respectively, on 10 December 1993, and 28 October 1994.

Pretrial Conference Transcript. Herein, citations to Pretrial Conference Transcripts
are denoted as "P.T.," followed by the hearing date with appropriate citation to the page
and line numbers. Similarly, citations to Reporter's Trial Transcript are denoted as "R.T."

maybe a Tuesday, I could get in but we are very current in this court and I'm
not going to delay the resolution of this case. As soon as you tell me it's
ready, within a matter of weeks you can have a half-day trial setting. Does
that sound fair?" (P.T., at p. 15, lines 13-20. Id.)
At the second pretrial conference held more than ten (10) months later, the court
continued this line of reasoning wherein it gave cognizance to the efforts thus far expended
in the matter and again stated as follows:
"I wonder — you obviously have both put in an extended amount of work
in trying to get this case either brought to trial or not. And I certainly want
to give you what time you want to present those arguments. I wonder if it
might be more fair to both of you to just allow me to call the rest of the
calender (sic) and see what we can get resolved and I would not have to rush
it through." (P.T., 28 October 1994, p. 3, lines 14-20. Ibid.)
Upon setting the trial date, the court then stated:
"Let's set this [for] 1:30 on December 16th. I'm going to allow that afternoon
a half day trial setting. Ill not set other matters, let you start right at 1:30 on
Friday, December 16th." (P.T., at p. 5, lines 13-16. Id.)
And concluding, stated again:
"...- - [tjhat will give us a realistic chance to get this done in a half day. ...
If you were to exchange that [list] by December 1st, and you have a first
place trial setting for Friday, December 16th at 1:30." (P.T., at p. 6, lines 1920, and p. 7, lines 2-4, respectively. Id.)
Thus, for more than a year in accordance with the aforesaid pronouncements —
notwithstanding the longevity of the facts in this case extending back more than a dozen
years — Defendant justifiably and reasonably relied upon the expectation that she was
going to be afforded a half-day for trial, or reasonably thereabout, to fully argue her
defenses to Plaintiffs claims and to prosecute her counterclaim allegations. Indeed, the
right to resort to the courts in order to obtain both procedural and substantive due process
is a fundamental right that has been guaranteed by the Constitution of the State of Utah
since its adoption and ratification in 1896. Art. I, § 11, thereof provides as follows:
"All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law,

which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no
person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party."
Citing this constitutional provision, the Utah Supreme Court has stated:
"The right to resort to the courts for the adjudication of grievances and the
settlement of disputes is a fundamental and important one." LeGrand
Johnson v. Peterson, 420 P.2d 615, 616 (Utah, 1966). See also, Barnhart v.
Civil Service Employees Insurance Co., 398 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah, 1965). Ibid.
Notwithstanding the long-anticipated time for trial however, on the very day of trial,
within mere hours of the scheduled time, Defendant was notified by the court that a one
(1) hour time restriction had been imposed in which to try the case. Defendant, in
reasonable reliance upon the trial court's prior statements in this regard, had allocated
roughly 1-1/2 hours each, more or less, in which to (i) argue and defend against Plaintiffs
claims, as set forth in Part A of her pleadings, and (ii) to prosecute her counterclaim
allegations under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") and the Utah Consumer
Sales Practices Act ("UCSPA"), as set forth in Part B thereof. Having thus been untimely
restricted as aforesaid, Defendant was deprived of the essential elements of substantive and
procedural due process and, as the proximate result thereof, suffered undue harm and
prejudice.
It is axiomatic that "due process" literally means "the process that is due," or, as
legally defined: "Law in its regular course of administration through courts of justice."4 It
is equally well-settled that an essential element of that process is the right to be heard, or,
one's right to his or her day in court. See, for example, State v. Sykes, 840 P.2d 825, 830
(Ut.Ct.App., 1992) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("Each person is entitled to his or her day in
court"). Indeed, due process is a fundamental guarantee under the fifth and fourteenth
amendments to the U. S. Constitution as well as Article I, section 7, of the Constitution of
4

Blacks, Second (1891); Sixth (abridged) (1991). Also, Bouvier's (1914).
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the State of Utah. Section one of the fourteenth amendment provides, in pertinent part, as
follows:
"...[n]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." Const. Amend., art. XIV.
Article I, section 7, of the Utah Constitution accordingly provides:
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law."
Perhaps the rationale of the foregoing is nowhere better expressed than by the words
of former United States Supreme Court Justice, George Sutherland, who, in a 1921 address
before the New York Bar when he was president of the American Bar Association, stated
thusly:
"Property, per se, has no rights; but the individual — the man — has three
great rights, equally sacred from arbitrary interference; the right to his life,
the right to his liberty, and the right to his property. The three rights are so
bound together as to be essentially one right. To give a man his life, but
deny him his liberty, is to take from him all that makes life worth living. To
give him his liberty but take from him the property which is the fruit and
badge of his liberty, is to still leave him a slave."
That the court below clearly recognized these fundamental tenets are inextricably
intertwined with due process cannot be doubted in view of its cited statements. Equally
doubtless is the fact that these tenets have application to matters both criminal and civil
as well as at law or in equity. The issues on appeal in this case raise valid due process
questions involving equity and equal protection, which issues could have been fully argued
at trial but for the court's demonstrated, untimely pretrial restriction. However true it may
be that "by not arguing an issue or presenting pertinent evidence before the trial court, an
appellant denies the trial court the opportunity to make findings of fact and conclusion of
law relevant to the issues raised or objections to evidence," LeBaron &Assocs., Inc. v. Rebel
Enters., Inc., 823 P.2d479, 483 n. 6 (Ut.Ct.App., 1991); accord State v. Rangel, 866 P.2d 607,

611 (Ut.Ct.App., 1993) (trial court should be allowed first opportunity to address claim that
it has erred), this rationale seemingly has no application where, as here, the court itself was
the principal actor in substantially precluding Defendant from such opportunity, even prior
to the event of trial. Owing principally to this restriction on time for trial, numerous issues
of fact in this case remain yet unadjudicated, some in their entirety, and particularly with
respect to the issues set forth in Defendant's counterclaim pursuant to Part B thereof,
although not strictly limited thereto. As the absence of substantive findings of fact upon
numerous unadjudicated material issues renders it virtually impossible to "marshal the
evidence" necessary to mount a successful challenge thereto, it becomes equally impossible
to comply with this Court's holding expressed in Robb v. Anderton, 863 P.2d 1322, 1328
(Ut.Ct.App., 1993) ("Appellate courts will not address the challenge unless the appellant
has properly marshaled the evidence"). Moreover, Rule 52(a), U.R.C.P., provides, in
pertinent part, that "...Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence,
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." Ibid. Given the
totality of the circumstances in this case and the unadjudicated documentary evidence
necessarily published in the record as the proximate result of the abbreviated proceedings,
it is not difficult to see that the court, by its own discretionary acts, effectively precluded
itself of the opportunity to find upon material facts and to judge witness credibility upon
direct examination thereof; all of which effectively operated to deprive Defendant of both
substantive and procedural due process.

Where, as here, the court below failed to

adequately find upon relevant and highly material facts and issues, 5 the same are rendered
non-existent and therefore incapable of either being upheld or adjudged to be clearly

These issues comprise the balance of the questions in this appeal.
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erroneous, as contemplated by Rule 52. To the extent such failure constitutes error, the
judgment rendered on that basis is due to be reversed. Anderson v. Utah County Bd. of
County Commas., 589 P.2d 1214,1216 (Utah, 1979) (failure to find upon all material issues
raised by the pleadings is reversible error); LeGrand Johnson Corp. v. Peterson, 18 Utah
2d 260, 262, 420 P.2d 615, 616 (1966) (It is the duty of the trial court to find upon all
material issues raised by the pleadings, and the failure to do so is reversible error), citing
Baker v. Hatch, 70 Utah 1, 9, 257 P.2d 673, 676; see also, Gaddis Investment Co. v.
Morrison, 3 Utah 2d 43, 278 P.2d 284 and cases cited therein. Defendant's counterclaim
pleadings raised such material issues, as set forth more fully hereinafter. It is equally
settled that it is the duty of the trial judge in contested cases to find facts upon all material
issues submitted for decision unless findings are waived. Boyer Co. v. Lignell, 567 P.2d
1112,1114 (Utah, 1977). By untimely precluding Defendant from arguing at trial various
issues previously determined by the court as "discoverable" and legitimate, w6 the court, by
its own discretionary action, created the very circumstance whereby it failed to enter
adequate findings, and on that basis alone the judgment requires vacating. In this case,
such findings were not only inadequate, but to the extent they remain unadjudicated at
trial they are clearly non-existent. Accordingly, Defendant argues that the absence of
adequate findings duly framed by the court renders the same legally insufficient.
Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 477 (Ut.Ct.App., 1991) (Appellants need not marshal
evidence when findings are so inadequate that they cannot be meaningfully challenged as
factual determinations; rather, appellant can simply argue legal insufficiency of court's
findings as framed). See also, Utah Standards of Appellate Review, Utah Bar Journal, Vol.
6

See, for example, P.T., 10 December 1993, p. 16, lines 5-8:
"The Court: ...[TJo tell you the truth, there's a number of items here that
certainly there is legitimate discovery and that they ought to be able to have
information.,,

7 No. 8, October 1994, p.25. Ibid.
Of equal relevance in this case is the fact that neither is due process dependent, in
any respect, upon a specified dollar amount. Nevertheless, the record clearly shows that
the court below obviously considered "certain" amounts, even those in excess of Plaintiffs
claim,7 to be of questionable merit where, during the course of trial, the court impliedly
stated:
"Let me ask you (inaudible) a whole trial over payment on a $5,000 claim?"
(R.T., p. 23, lines 23-24.)
Yet, at the first pretrial conference held 10 December 1993, the court had sent mixed signals
in this regard where it had previously said:
"... - - [a]nd this is after all a relatively modest case. The amount sued
upon, well, it's $4,000. It's an amount to which there's - - this is obviously
not an insubstantial amount of money and certainly attorneys ought to be
able to be well prepared before they go to trial for that - - for that kind of
case. On the other hand it's not a 40,000 — or a $400,000 case." P.T., 10
December 1993, pp. 11-12; lines 25, 1-6, respectively.
While the court's comments in this regard were at best inappropriate in view of its
known jurisdictional limitation precluding it from even deciding matters in excess of
$20,000.00,8 nevertheless, the plain inference conveyed by the court's comments was that
due process is seemingly functionally-dependent upon the amount at issue, viz,, the greater
the amount in controversy, the more process that is due, and vice-versa.

This is

particularly repugnant when considered in light of the fact that the U. S. Constitution itself,
for example, requires only that "...[w]here the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, ...". U. S. Const. Amend. VII.

7

The amount originally sought in Plaintiffs complaint was $3,976.64.

8

§ 78-4-7, Utah Code Ann., provides: "The circuit court has civil jurisdiction, both
law and equity, in all matters if the sum claimed is less than $20,000, exclusive of court
costs, ..."
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Moreover, neither does decisional law, federal or state, reflect any such monetary-amount
bias, and particularly with respect to actions daiming under the FDCPA, as may be seen
in the following federal appellate cases and the amounts in controversy therein decided:
Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314,1316 (2nd Cir., 1993): $9.42; Crosskv v. Lieberman, 868
F.2d 566,567 (3rd Cir., 1989): $297.79; Swanson v. Southern Oregon Credit Service, Inc., 869
F.2d 1222,1224 (9th Cir., 1989): $262.20; and Pressleu v. Capital Credit & Collection Service.
Inc., 760 F.2d 922, 923 (9th Cir., 1985): $126.07. Numerous federal district cases also
demonstrate a similar lack of bias with respect to the monetary amounts in controversy:
Seabrook v. Onandaga Bureau of Medical Economics, Inc., 705 F.Supp. 81, 82 (N.D.N. Y.,
1989): $198.00; Riveria v. MAB Collections, Inc., 682 F.Supp. 174, 175 (W.D.N.Y., 1988):
$80.20, $31.96; Kimberv. Federal Financial Corporation, 668 F.Supp. 1480,1482 (M.D.Ala.,
1987): $150.70; Bingham v. Collection Bureau, Inc., 505 F.Supp. 864, 867 (D.N.D., 1981):
$958.65; Rutynav. Collection Accounts Terminal, Inc., 478 F.Supp. 980, 981 (N.D.Dl., 1979):
$56.00; Kizer v. Finance America Credit Corporation, 454 F.Supp. 937,938 (N.D.Miss., 1978)
([F]DCPA provides an independent jurisdictional grant without regard to jurisdictional
amount). See also In Re Scrimpsher, Bkrtcy., 17 B.R. 999,1007 (N.D.N.Y., 1982): $245.93,
citing Carrigan v. Central Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 494 F.Supp. 824, 826 (N.D.Ga., 1980)
(federal student loan for tuition qualified as a 'debt' under FDCPA). State precedent is no
different: Action Professional Service v. Kiggins, 458 N.W.2d 365, 366 (S.D., 1990): $217;
Johnson v. Statewide Collections, Inc., 778 P.2d 93, 96 (Wyo., 1989): $144.99; Venes v.
Professional Service Bureau, Inc., 353 N.W.2d 671, 673 (Minn. App., 1984): $552.40; Philips
v. Periodical Publishers' Service Bureau, Inc., 369 S.E.2d 154, 155 (S.C.App., 1988), cert,
granted, 300 S.C. 444, 388 S.E.2d 787 (1989): $8.05.
The foregoing decisions conclusively demonstrate that, contrary to the inferences of
the court below, due process clearly does not hang by any thread so tenuous as the mere

monetary amount at issue. Thus,, to the extent the court's decision to untimely restrict the
time for trial was based upon this shortfall from what it apparently deemed to be a
"meritorious/1 albeit notably undefined, amount at issue, particularly where the court
referred to amounts ranging from twice to twenty times that of its jurisdiction to decide,
Defendant was concomitantly denied substantive and procedural due process and unduly
prejudiced thereby. The inappropriateness of the rationale behind the court's comment in
this regard was soundly rejected by the Supreme Court years ago when it considered an
analogous fact situation regarding the necessity of making findings on the material facts
as opposed to reasonings of the court's conscience. In reversing the decision of the trial
court and vacating the judgment on remand in that respect, the Court said:
"The necessity of making findings of fact on the disputed issues is given
emphasis in this case by the statement we have quoted above, made by the
trial judge: that although he would not allow recovery he 'feels that the
plaintiff has a moral entitlement' to additional money. This is particularly so
because this case is in equity wherein the plea for redress is directed to the
conscience of the court. The observation referred to impresses us as a candid
indication that the matter was not settled to his satisfaction. However well
intentioned, it seems a futile suggestion in the face of difficulties which drove
the parties to a lawsuit involving in excess of $25,000. It appears not to have
been helpful to the parties, nor to the court in dealing with the already
sufficient perplexities which this situation presents." LeGrand Johnson v.
Peterson, 18 Utah 2d, at 262, 420 P.2d, at 616.
With respect to due process issues such as the one on appeal here, the Utah Supreme
Court has said:
"That the rights of individuals and the assurance that they will be
safeguarded by the courts and the process of law are considered essential to
the maintenance of what we are pleased to call our well-ordered society is
shown by the inclusion of Art. I, Sec. 11 in our Utah Constitution:
'All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done
to him in his person, * * * shall have remedy by due course of
law, * * * and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or
defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or
counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party'."
See also Barnhartv. Civil Service Employees Insurance Co., 398 P.2d 873, 876 (Utah, 1965),
cited in Citu of St George v. Turner, 860 P.2d 929, 932 (Utah, 1993). Ibid.
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It is thus to be seen that the untimely restrictions placed upon the time for trial as
imposed by the court below within mere hours of the scheduled trial time, which
restrictions unduly and essentially deprived Defendant of the day in court to which she
was unquestionably entitled, runs counter to both the expressed purpose and the spirit of
our system of justice.

By the court's own act it precluded itself from fulfilling its

responsibility of remaining fully available to properly adjudicate all material issues and
controversies presented by this case, and in doing so substantially impaired the rights of
Defendant in particular to examine witnesses in prosecution of her counterclaim. The
reticence with which this should, if ever, be done is further emphasized by realizing that
such arbitrary discretion, even in advance of trial, substantially cuts into the procedural
safeguards that otherwise our law so adequately provides for. But even more significant
is the fact that a less clear and complete record results, thus impairing to a substantial
degree the right to an accurate review of all the material facts on appeal.
The circuit court's error, as a matter of law, by untimely restricting the time for trial
thus depriving Defendant of her rightful day in court to which she was clearly entitled,
constituted an unreasonable denial of an essential, fundamental right. The resultant loss
of due process and equal protection carried with it substantial harm and prejudice where
the record is devoid of facts it should otherwise contain. For the reasons set forth herein,
the judgment rendered against Defendant is, therefore, due to be reversed; the error not
being harmless.
(Respecting Part A)
ISSUE #2: Did the circuit court err in granting judgment to Plaintiff where
Defendant had previously raised, in her amended Answer pleadings pursuant to Rule 8(c),
U.R.GP., the affirmative defense that Plaintiffs claims were stale and thus barred by the
doctrine of waiver, laches, and estoppel?
The gravamen of Plaintiffs complaint stems from the assignment only in 1991 of an

alleged debt purported to be then owed by Defendant to Plaintiffs Assignor. However,
the underlying issue in this case, and one that merits review on appeal, is the fact of
Assignor's breach of a prior contractual agreement with Defendant, dated 31 March 1981,
which breach remained uncured and unaccounted for through the date of trial, thus
antedating Plaintiffs assignment by nearly a full decade. As of 4 October 1982, Plaintiffs
Assignor was then indebted to Defendant in the principal amount of at leasst $1,235.26,
exclusive of interest accruals since that time, and was thus guilty of having unclean hands.
At trial, Defendant was able to preponderate on the fact that via her signed contract,
Plaintiff's Assignor was so indebted and had thereafter failed at all times during the
pendency of this action to account for, record, and/or credit to Defendant's dental account
all or even any part of this long-standing, prior contractual indebtedness. 9 Assignor's
dental services rendered to Defendant were completed on or about 25 September 1984 and
Plaintiff proved, as well, using Assignor's own statement that the final insurance payment
of $1,250 had, in fact, been received by Assignor on or about 22 March 1985.10 At no time
thereafter did Assignor ever provide to Defendant a complete accounting of the total dental
charges for services rendered in her behalf, nor any record of the insurance payments
received with respect thereto, or with regard to Assignor's direct negotiations with
Defendant's carrier, nor the application of all or any part of the amounts due under its

9

See R.T., p. 74, lines 8-9: "...[A]t any rate you win on that one. For that I deducted
twelve thirty-five. ..." See also, R.T., pp. 76-77, lines 21-25 and line 1, respectively: "The
big ticket item that changes it a lot is the $1,235 and that's what — and you won on that
one, that's what trials are for. I'm convinced that at least your subjective impression was
you're going to get a $1,200 credit for that machine. That may or may not have been the
deal but they weren't here to contest it so that's the way that goes."
10

See R.T., p. 75, line 20: H...[t]he eighth payment of 1,250,...". See also R.Idx.,
Defendant's trial exhibit of Assignor's handwritten statement indicating this amount having
been paid as a part of her total of payments rendered, and also as demonstrated in her
"summary of payments." (Ridx., 256.)
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original contract default. The evidence in this case also reflects, in addition, that at some
indeterminate point in time prior to 31 December 1990, Plaintiffs Assignor purged its
records of information pertaining to Defendant's account.11 Thereafter, on 25 April 1991,
or more than 6-1/2 years after the completion of Defendant's dental treatments, and more
than 10 years after Assignor's contractual default to Defendant, Assignor elected to assign
to Plaintiff the alleged debt purported to be owed by Defendant for the purposes of
collection. Owing to Assignor's inexcusable delay in asserting its claim and the resultant
prejudice and disadvantage suffered by Defendant thereby, it was therefore proper for
Defendant, upon answering Plaintiffs complaint, to assert the equitable affirmative defense
that "Plaintiffs claims are barred on the grounds of waiver, laches, and estoppel."12
The '"Doctrine of laches' is based upon the maxim that equity aids the vigilant and
not those who slumber on their rights." It is the "unreasonable or unexplained delay in
asserting [a] right which works disadvantage to another. Laches requires an element of
estoppel or neglect which has operated to prejudice of defendant."13 In this regard,
Bouvier's14 indicates that:
"'... [t]his doctrine is based upon the grounds of public policy which requires
for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims,' Mackall v.
Casilear, 137 U.S. 556, 11 S.Ct. 178, 34 L.Ed. 776, and 'The question whether
one is precluded from equitable relief by the staleness of his demand is for
the court and not for the jury.' Raymond v. Flavel, 27 Ore. 219, 40 P. 158. It
goes on to state that 'Courts of equity withhold relief from those who have
delayed the assertion of their claims for an unreasonable time, and the mere

11

See Record Index ("R.Idx."), pp. 213-14, a computer-generated document entitled
"Account Ledger Card." See page 1, line 1, Column 5: "Ref" "Purge."
12

See Defendant's Amended Answer and Counterclaim, "Seventh Affirmative
Defense," p. 5. Ibid.
13

Black's, Abridged Sixth Ed., p. 606.

14

Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 3 vol. ed., (1914).

fact that suit was brought within a reasonable time does not prevent the
application of the doctrine of laches when there is a want of diligence in the
prosecution.1 Alsop v. Riker, 155 U.S. 449, 15 S.Ct. 162, 39 L.Ed. 218;
Hagerman v. Bates, 5 CaLApp. 391, 38 P. 1100. The question of laches
depends not upon the fact that a certain definite time has elapsed since the
cause of action accrued, but upon whether, under all the circumstances, the
plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in not instituting the
proceedings sooner.' Tawnsend v. Vanderwerker, 160 U.S. 171,16 S.Ct 258,
40 L.Ed. 383; Mclntire v. Pruor, 173 U.S. 38, 19 S.Ct. 352, 43 L.Ed. 606; 'It is
not measured by the statute of limitations.' Alsop, supra"
Laches embodies the fundamental principle that "he who seeks equity must do
equity," therefore, "having sought equity, it is incumbent upon plaintiff to do equity."
Coleman Co., Inc. v. Southwest Field Irrigation Co., 584 P.2d 883, 884; (Utah 1978); accord,
Carbon Canal Co. v. Sanpete Water Users Ass'n., 425 P.2d 405, (Utah, 1967). As Defendant
properly asserted the affirmative defense of laches in her amended answer and
counterclaim, she dtdy met her burden under the rationale of Walker v. Walker, 404 P.2d
253, 257 (Utah, 1963), wherein the Supreme Court stated:
"Burden of taking some affirmative action should be on him who accuses
the other of delay and unless he has taken such action or in some manner put
other party on notice that action is required, he cannot take advantage of the
delay." Id.
In further clarification of the foregoing as respecting the instant case, it is instructive to
note the decision of the Supreme Court of Hawaii wherein it stated:
"Equitable doctrine of laches applies where long acquiescence in assertion
of adverse rights has occurred,... or when, during inexcusable delay evidence
has become obscured and, under circumstances of case, it is too late to
ascertain merits of controversy." Anderson v. Anderson, 585 P.2d 938, 947
(Hawaii, 1978).
See also Brahenderx. Kit Mfg. Co., 568 P.2d 547 (Mont, 1977) ("Laches" is negligence in
assertion of a right; it exists when there has been an unexplained delay of such duration
or character as to render enforcement of asserted right inequitable); Clark v. Chipman, 510
P.2d 1257, 212 Kan. 259 (1973) ("Laches" is an equitable device designed to bar stale claims
and courts of equity will regard long passage of time in asserting claims with disfavor
apart from any particular statute of limitations); Longshaw v. Corbitt, 420 P.2d 980, 4
Ariz. App. 408 (1966) (The elements necessary to constitute laches are lack of diligence on
the part of one and injury to another due to lack of diligence).
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The record in this case clearly indicates that Plaintiffs claims suffered from the loss
of relevant evidence as the proximate result of Assignor's inexcusable delay in the assertion
of adverse rights, as indicated in the following excerpts:
"The Court: ...[TJhat's why I'm saying that we're kidding ourselves if you
think no matter how able or wonderful you can be and how attentive and I'd
really try to listen we'd spend the next week trying to pour through this but
we can't discover it." (R.T., p. 64, lines 21-25.)
And further on the court said:
"...[W]e're talking about purged computer records and old records and at
least what initially was kind of a handshake deal too, based on a separate
business acquaintance and all of that lends itself into not being able to have
the kind of facts I know that the attorneys would like to have in presenting
a case." (R.T., p. 72, lines 20-25.) "...[A]nd what I've done is taken all of the
extant records, understanding that there is a hole prior to 1986 - - 1984, I'm
sorry." (R.T., p. 73, lines 10-12.) "...pQt is the position of the Plaintiff that the
$515 either wasn't paid or it was already reduced somewhere back in the
olden days before I can get the records." (R.T., p. 74, lines 14-17.) "...[TJhat
may or may not have been the deal but they weren't here to contest it so
that's the way that goes." (R.T., p. 77-78, lines 25, 1, respectively.)
Thus it is evident that not only was Assignor negligent in asserting and assigning
its claim for an unconscionable period, but as a result of that negligence Plaintiffs case
suffered markedly from the loss of evidence and the disappearance of at least one material
witness with whom Defendant had dealt in 1982:
"Q. (By Mr. Stanton) When Associated Dental Products changed names to
Oral Dental Health you spoke to someone about the machine. Who did you
speak with?
"A. (Mrs. Murdock) The owner of Associated Dental Group.
"Q. Who was that?
"A. His name was Craig. I can't remember his last name, it's been 12 years
ago, but he signed it and you can't hardly read his signature, but I do have
a document.
15

The "document" here testified to by the Defendant is the Diversified Office Systems,
Inc. Sales Agreement ("Defendant's Contract") referred to at the outset of the Statement of
the Case, which the court refused to admit into evidence at trial, notwithstanding the fact
that Defendant prevailed on this evidence and was awarded a principal-only credit of
$1235.00 therefor "by a preponderance of the evidence." See R.T. p. 39, line 13, through p.
(continued...)
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"Q. And it went from Associated Dental to Oral Dental Health?
"A. Yes.
"Q. Was he an owner in Oral Dental Health?
"A. He owned it.
"Q. Okay.
"Mr. MuUiner: I am going to object to this, Your Honor. The document that's
been admitted establishes that Oral Health Center is Kent Davis and Oral
Dalton. This other person, I have no idea who he is, I have no idea where
we're going with this. If she signed - - " (R.T., pp. 44-45, lines 10-25, 1-3,
respectively.)
The testimony elicited here concerned events which antedated Assignor's assignment
to Plaintiff of its claim by nearly a decade thus resulting in counsel's confusion, and further
demonstrating the underlying grounds and justification for Defendant's affirmative defense
of laches based upon Assignor's lack of diligence and unclean hands with the resultant
injustice certain to occur if Plaintiffs claims are not held barred. Moreover, the court's
reference to "...[w]hat initially was kind of a handshake deal too..." is also in error as the
agreement to trade Assignor's default on Defendant's contract was secondary to the
contract itself. The fact that Assignor failed to keep its commitment under the "handshake
deal," so-called, had no legal effect upon its prior contractual obligation to Defendant thus
further proving its unclean hands.
As indicated herein, the availability of the equitable defense of laches is contingent
upon the establishment of two elements: (1) the lack of diligence on the part of plaintiff;
and (2) an injury to defendant owing to such lack of diligence. Papanikolas Brothers
Enterprises v. Sugarhouse Shopping Center Associates, 535 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah, 1975);
cited in Leaver v. Grose, 610 P.2d 1262, 1264 (Utah, 1980); Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah
Division of State Lands and Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 731 (Utah, 1990); Sandy Citu v. Salt

15

(...continued)
52, line 3, and pp. 73-74, lines 22-25 and 1-10, respectively. A copy of that document,
together with the Diversified delivery receipt, the Associated Dental Group check stub, and
the business card bearing the name "Craig," are annexed hereto in Appendix EL
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Lake County, 827 R2d 227, 230 n.5 (Utah, 1992). Both of those elements are abundantly
evident in this case, together with the additional factors of the loss of evidence, the
unavailability of a material witness named "Craig,H and the unclean hands of Plaintiffs
Assignor.
In stun, laches developed as an equitable analog to legal statutes of limitation and
operates, when found, as a bar to an action, not as an element to diminish an award. See
G. Dobbs, Remedies, 43. "The basis of laches in equity is unreasonable delay and lack of
diligence extending for so long a time or under circumstances that it would be inequitable
to grant relief." Rhoads v. Albertson's, Inc., 574 P.2d 114,116 (Colo.App., 1977), reversed,
582 P.2d 1049. "Laches bars a recovery when there has been a delay by one party causing
a disadvantage to the other party." Papanikolas, supra, 535 P.2d at 1260. The record in
this case clearly demonstrates Assignor's long acquiescence in assertion of adverse rights
pursuant to an alleged claim against Defendant where the record in this case shows that
Assignor waited for more than 6-1/2 years before electing to act in that regard, and where,
during such inexcusable delay, evidence has become obscured and material witnesses, other
than Defendant, having first-hand knowledge of the facts were not available. Anderson,
supra, 585 P.2d at 947. As such, Assignor's alleged claim was barred from the outset by
the equitable doctrine of laches and that guilt was not overcome by the mere assignment
of that claim to a third party collection agency. Thus, Defendant properly raised this
affirmative defense in her pleadings where Plaintiffs claims were stale and, therefore,
barred ab initio. Accordingly, the judgment should be reversed with instructions to vacate.
ISSUE NO, 3: Did the circuit court err by denying Defendant equal protection under
the law where it awarded assignee Plaintiff the benefit of interest pursuant to Assignor's
contract while precluding Defendant from calculating like interest amounts pursuant to her
unambiguous contract upon which Assignor had previously defaulted in order to obtain
an equal, or greater, offset against assignee Plaintiffs daims as provided pursuant to Rule
13(c), U.RGP.?

Notwithstanding Defendant's direct testimony regarding her clearly unambiguous
contract dated 31 March 1982, upon which Plaintiffs Assignor had originally defaulted
nearly six months prior to Defendant's first visit following negotiations to effect a trade for
dental services in lieu of Assignor's payment therefor (see footnote #16, ante), and further
notwithstanding the fact that Defendant was able to establish that no credit for those
amounts had ever been applied towards her dental charges in consideration of Assignor's
default, the court nevertheless, refused to admit Defendant's contract into evidence despite
her argument to the contrary. At one of several inaudible sidebars that occurred during
the course of trial, this issue was discussed. Defendant argued that if her contract were not
admitted as evidence and the interest terms therein were not going to be allowed in
calculating an equal or greater offset against Assignor's contract, except for the principal
amount as it existed 12 years previous, then neither should Assignor's contract receive the
benefit of interest calculations in determination of the final judgment award. To hold
otherwise would be to stand the doctrine of equal protection on its head. Moreover, while
ignoring the fact that Defendant's contract provided for an equal imposition of interest, the
court reasoned, rationalized, and took great pain to explain to Defendant why Assignor's
contract should be upheld:
"The Court: Now Mr. Stanton on several occasions has rather eloquently
argued, and I want you to know that he didn't surrender the position, he
argued that - - so I don't want you to fault him at all. I take responsibility
for the ruling - - he asked that I not allow the one and-a-half percent interest
on the declining balance, claiming that it's their fault, sort of, because they
were so dilatory in making insurance claims or they - - they were, rather,
insurance company and that sort of thing.
"I guess all I can tell is that, again, that's what, not only are lawsuits
determined and filed so you can contest facts but also there's some legal
arguments that attorneys made and it does seem to me that as between
apportioning, you know, who bears the loss of use of money and you signing
a contract has to mean something. I'm already finding all kinds of things like
that there's a sewing machine - - a postage machine. I tried to give you the
benefit of every reasonable construction but I just really can't close my eyes
and simply rule on the one and-a-half percent. I think I need to - - this is,

after all a business relationship, it's not just judgment. And it seems to me
that there's just a time value of money that's different than in paying services
in 1992 and now in 1994 than it is paying for services in 1984.
"We are talking about an old account, so I can - - I think we'd really
be - - I would not be doing any justice to the contract, Ms. Murdock. I know
that you probably have some emotional credit that's not recorded. I do want
you to know that Mr. Stanton made the appropriate legal arguments and
pleasantly and persistently asked me to rule otherwise." (R.T., pp. 78-79, lines
9-25 and 1-13, respectively.)
In this regard the court erred for several reasons: First, the exclusion of Defendant's
contract from evidence constituted a denial of equal protection where Assignor had
previously agreed to be bound by its terms upon execution; Second, Defendant was unduly
prejudiced by the imposition of interest under Assignor's contract while being denied the
same benefit pursuant to the terms of her contract in order to calculate an equitable offset;
Third, although Defendant had agreed to trade an equivalent amount of dental services to
cure Assignor's default, that default remained uncured where Assignor thereafter failed to
account for or credit Defendant's account with such amounts and such failure did not
operate to extinguish Assignor's obligations under the terms of Defendant's contract;
Fourtfi, by excluding Defendant's contract from evidence, the court failed to properly
interpret the same, thereby depriving Defendant of due process and equal protection; and
Fifth, by limiting Defendant's award to the 1982 principal-only amount then due as a
matter of law, the court thereby failed, in addition, to determine what the parties intended
when Assignor executed Defendant's contract
Because Defendant's contract is highly relevant to the facts in this case, due process
and fundamental fairness required at least a reasonable interpretation thereof. To the
extent that Defendant's "w[i]n on that one" 16 constituted an "interpretation" as a matter of
law without regard for extrinsic evidence, the court's interpretation is afforded no

R.T., p. 76, line 22.

particular weight on appeal. In that regard, this Court has said:
"If the trial court interprets a contract as a matter of law without regard for
extrinsic evidence, we afford its interpretation no particular weight.
Seashores, Inc. v. Hancey, 738 P.2d 645, 647 (Ut.Ct.App., 1987). The primary
rule in interpreting a contract is to determine what the parties intended by
looking at the entire contract and all of its parts in relation to each other,
giving an objective and reasonable construction to the contract as a whole.'
Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105, 1107-08 (Utah, 1982)." C/. Baker v.
Western Surety Co., 757 P.2d 878, 881 (Ut.Ct.App., 1988).
See also Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Division of State Lands and Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 725
(Utah, 1990); Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060,1061-62 (Utah, 1981); Hal Taylor
Assocs. v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 749 (Utah, 1982).
As is the case with Assignor's contract, under the equally unambiguous terms of
Defendant's contract it also provides as follows: "...[tjhe purchaser agrees to pay a
reasonable attorney's fee and agrees to pay interest on past due accounts at the rate of 11/2% per month, 18% per year." As this provision clearly constitutes an essential element
of "all of its parts," by the court's failure to allow "what the parties intended" when the
contract was executed that interpretation should thus be afforded "no particular weight"
on this appeal. To the extent the court erred by summarily excluding Defendant's contract
from evidence, the judgment should be reversed and remanded with an order directing
that Defendant's contract be admitted in the record as relevant evidence, and that a proper
interpretation thereof be made for calculation of the amount of interest to be applied,
consistent with its terms as the parties intended, as an offset against the amount awarded
by the court under the terms of Assignor's contract, as sought in Defendant's counterclaim
pursuant to Rule 13(c).
ISSUE NO. 4: Did the circuit court err in granting judgment to Plaintiff where it
calculated Plaintiffs claims by relying on defense exhibit incorporating Assignor's unproven
amounts in light of finding that Plaintiffs case suffered from lack of adequate evidence in
the record?
Plaintiff commenced its action by praying for "judgment against Defendant in the
amount of $3,976.64, interest, costs, and such other and further relief as to the Court seems

meet in the premises." Paragraph 3 of Plaintiffs complaint states as follows:
"3. Defendant is indebted to Oral Health Center (the assignor) for
professional services and the amount due as of November 4,1991, is the sum
of $3,976.64." (RJdx. p. 1 & 2.)
Paragraph 2 thereof provides:
"2. The debts herein sued upon were assigned to Plaintiff by written
assignment. The entire amount thereof is past due and owing." Ibid.
At trial, however, the record shows that Plaintiff was unable to prove these
allegations as the proximate result of Assignor's inexcusable delay in asserting its claim,
together with its proven inaccurate accounting and recordation methods, the loss of
relevant evidence, and the unavailability of a material witness having first-hand knowledge
of the facts from the outset. As a result of these facts Plaintiff was awarded only $528.00,
plus an indeterminate amount of interest to be calculated over a period certain and added
thereto. But even this amotint was arrived at in error where the court based its findings
not on the amount set forth in Plaintiffs complaint, rather, it chose to rely, instead, on the
erroneous information set forth in the hand-written monthly statements originally provided
to Defendant by Assignor in 1984 and 1985 in arriving at "the highest gross amount" 17 the
court could ascertain from that "evidence," such being the sum of $5,328.00, rather than the
$3,976.64 Plaintiff had sued for. Thus, Plaintiff (and Assignor) received, at the discretion
of the court, the benefit of an added windfall of $1,350.00 more than they had even sued
for. This, of course, more than totally negated the $1,235.00 credit Defendant had received
as a principal-only award for Assignor's original default on her contract. Had the court
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See R.T., p. 73, line 5, through p. 78, line 8. Notwithstanding this ruling in its favor,
Plaintiff nevertheless prepared findings of fact and conclusions of law, dated 5 January
1995, setting forth therein a judgment amount, not of $528.00, but "...[i]n the principal sum
of $1,761.49, $2,285.85 accumulated interest, and costs incurred herein." This set in motion
a post-trial dispute which was only resolved at a hearing 5-1/2 months after trial on 5 May
1995, and only then so this matter could be brought up on this appeal.

properly based its calculations on the amount set forth in Plaintiffs complaint, as assigned
and alleged by Assignor, the resultant amount would have been $822.00 in favor of
Defendant, as derived from the difference between the $1,350.00 windfall and the $528.00
judgment in favor of Plaintiff, the interest amounts notwithstanding. In arriving at this
"highest gross amount," however, the court had to admit that "...[ijt's kind of a fiction how
I arrived at it in a sense." (R.T., p. 80, lines 16-22.) By basing its calculations on this
"highest gross amount" rather than the original amount assigned and subsequently sued
upon by Plaintiff, the court erred further where it had already determined that the amount
defaulted upon by Assignor under Defendants contract had never been credited to
Defendant's account, hence her "w[i]n on that one."
As it was established that as of 4 October 1982, Assignor was indebted to Defendant
in the amount of at least $1,235.00, she should have started with a credit balance of that
amount, against which dental charges would have been properly been deducted as they
were incurred. Where it was determined at trial that this had not been the case, it was
plain error for the court to thereafter conclude that the $5,328.00 figure was a valid point
from which to begin its calculation of the final judgment amount, and particularly where
the record reflects Assignor's own hand-written document indicating the total charges
incurred by Defendant to be $4,975.00, between the dates of 4 October 1982 and 25
September 1984. (R.Idx., #212.) (See R.T., p. 73, lines 12-21.)
Accordingly, the judgment should be reversed and the court's calculations reviewed
for a proper determination consistent with the evidence.
ISSUE NO, 5: Did the circuit court err by finding that Defendant had failed to prove,
"by a preponderance of the evidence/1 that she had a cause of action pursuant to the
FDCPA and the UCSPA where she was precluded from prosecuting her claims thereunder
as the proximate result of the time restraints imposed for trial?
At the conclusion of trial of Part A regarding the subject matter of Plaintiffs

complaint, Defendant had to remind the court of her counterclaim alleging Plaintiffs
violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq„ and
the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act ("UCSPA") § 13-11-19 et seq., where the court had
previously denied Plaintiffs motion in limine in this regard at the outset of the
proceedings. 18 As the restricted time allotted for trial had already been consumed in its
entirety, Defendant suggested that since Plaintiffs answers to discovery were previously
published and admitted into evidence, and where it appeared that Plaintiff had admitted
to the alleged violations therein, that the court review those answers and base its decision
in comparison with the provisions of the FDCPA and make its ruling accordingly. At this
the court then stated:
,f

Will you just give me a Reader's Digest — what do you believe — what is
the conduct that violated the — ... IVe got your counterclaim and exhibits."
(R.T., p. 86, lines 17-19, 24-25.)
Following a brief discussion in this regard the court expressed some doubts:
,f

Well, okay. Help me a little bit. Pm going to tell you right now that I
don't see the violation. If you want — I see they sent a letter —". (R.T. p. 92,
lines 9-11.) (The court was here referring to one of two letters sent by
Defendant to Plaintiff during the pendency of this action.)
Defendant subsequently offered to submit a brief further outlining the specific provisions
of the FDCPA in detail, which the court declined, stating:
"I think it would be fair if you just told me right now and let Mr. Mulliner
argue back right now. ... Tell me, why is that a violation?" (R.T., p. 92, lines
14-15; line 20.)
Defendant proceeded to explain to the court that the FDCPA establishes the
violations and that the specific violations alleged to have been committed by Plaintiff were

R.T., p. 4, lines 14-16; p. 11, lines 20-25.

listed in the counterclaim presently before the court.19 Notwithstanding this explanation
and attempt to direct the court's attention to the specific allegations set forth in Defendant's
counterclaim pleadings and exhibits then before the court, and having previously referred
the court to the concurring notes prepared by its law clerk on the subject,20 the court
proceeded to demonstrate its fundamental misconception of the provisions of both the
FDCPA and the UCSPA by the following statement wherein the court not only combined
the provisions of the acts just stated, but hopelessly confused the issues instead by mixing
in the largely off-point matters involved in Part A regarding the subject matter of Plaintiffs
complaint:
'Shouldn't rely on a 1982 agreement on a postage machine that I give to her
if you're asking me about fairness, and I do understand that the statute
speaks to liberally and that sort of thing, but there's nothing in here that
jumps up and down and says that your client was misled or made some
payments or was browbeaten to do anything. She certainly wasn't
browbeaten into anything, she went out and got a very fine attorney to
represent her." (R.T., p. 93, lines 14-21.)
Where it was thus evident that the court had completely confused the separate
nature of the provisions designated in Part A relating to Plaintiffs complaint and those
regarding the issues and allegations contained in Part B counterclaiming Plaintiffs alleged
violations of both the FDCPA and the UCSPA, together with the fact that no testimony
with regard to Plaintiffs alleged violation of these acts was going to be permitted owing
to the lack of time to fully prosecute the matter, the following conversation ensued:
"Mr. Stanton: (for Defendant) All right. We've made our allegations in the
counterclaim, they're specific in there for you. We've provided the
admissions and then the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act based upon those,
make your ruling and then well go from there."
19
20

R.T., p. 92, lines 21-22; p. 93, lines 12-13.

R.T., pp. 7-8, lines 23-25 and 1-24, respectively. See Appendix for copy of
handwritten notes of law clerk, Wayne D. Jones, which Defendant moved to publish, and
admit into evidence.

"Mr. Mulliner: (for Plaintiff) And we admit we sent those documents. We
deny that those documents in any way violate the Act and I take it that that's
your ruling, that they don't violate the Act." (R.T., pp. 93-94, lines 22-25,1-5.)
Further discussion ensued between counsel for both Parties and the court, but no
examination of witnesses transpired concerning Defendant's counterclaim allegations, the
court having previously decided as follows:
"Again, let me just say for those of you who are interested in Ms. Murdock's
behalf and for the collection agency wondering why it is we don't proceed
with the trial and do more testimony, that this is just not the kind of case that
anyone's oral testimony that's here today could offer any additional help to
us." (R.T., p. 73, lines 5-10.)
Following the brief, cursory discussions regarding Defendant's allegations pursuant to the
provisions of the FDCPA, the court then found as follows:
"Do you have anything else? Okay, then I'm not going to deny plaintiffs
claim for relief under the counterclaim and based on what has been presented
to me in Exhibit A, 111 find that the defendant failed to meet its burden of
proof of providing evidence to the Court." (R.T., p. 99, lines 12-16.)
Whereupon, Defendant then queried the court as follows:
"Mr. Stanton: Is that based upon admissions as well or just upon Exhibit
A?"
"The Court: It's based on everything that you say and what you didn't say.
It's based on the evidence that I have before me at this time (inaudible) I was
told to go back to my room and read or something. And so at this time then
I'll just - - the judgment on the counterclaim will stand but we're going to let
that - - hold that for this few days."21 (R.T., p. 99, lines 17-24.)
Following this exchange a short sidebar occurred where the exhibits to be pubUshed were
discussed. In that regard the court stated:
"The Court: Now let's see, I've been handed some exhibits. Let's see — the
one exhibit. Tell me what you want. What we ought to do is very carefully
retain the correct exhibits in case Mr. Stanton wants to have the appellate
court look at it. (R.T., p. 100, lines 5-9.) ... Ill hand that to you. Is that all
right there? That's another case I've got. You've got that one exhibit."
(Whereupon this portion of the hearing was inaudible.) ...
21

In the latter part of this statement, the court was referring to the time alloted for
calculaing the interest amounts previously awarded to Plaintiff at trial, which award
constitutes the subject matter of Issue No. 5 herein.

"Do you move to publish?"
"Mr. Stanton: Yes, admit those." (Inaudible.) (R.T., 100, lines 20-25.)
"The Court: If you decide that you want the appellate court to look at that,
I'm certainly not — 111 do everything I possibly can to make the record
clearer." (R.T., pp. 101, lines 1-3.) ... So, well, we ought to have those and the
plaintiffs answers to defendant's requests for admissions and certificate of
service, response to her second set. These are the items you wanted.
"Mr. Stanton: Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 2."
"The Court: All right." (R.T., 101, lines 6-11.)
In order for the Court of Appeals to more fully understand the "fundamental
misconception"22 of the court below respecting its conclusoiy analysis of Defendant's
counterclaims under the FDCPA and the UCSPA, it must first understand something of the
congressional intent underlying its passage of the FDCPA and its purpose for authorizing
even greater protection under state laws — in this case the UCSPA.23 Owing to the lack
of abundance of Utah decisional law regarding the FDCPA, it is first deemed appropriate
to consult the federal decisions that have addressed these issues and, secondly, various
other state supreme and appellate court decisions so published.
The FDCPA traces its genesis to section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (the
"FTC Act") of 1914. 38 Stat. 717, ch. 311 (15 U.S.C. § 45 et seq.) Section 5(a)(1) of the FTC
Act reads:
"Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts
or practices in commerce, are declared unlawful."
In passing the Act, doubtless Congress was aware of the language rendered in
Florence Manufacturing Co. v. J.C. Dawd & Co., 178 F. 73, 75 (2nd Cir., 1910), an unfair
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The phrase employed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in its decision rendered
in Swanson v. Southern Oregon Credit Service, Inc., 869 F.2d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir., 1988).
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See Senate Report No. 382, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. reprinted in in 1977 U. S. Code
Cong. Admin. News 1695, 1700 ("The Committee believes that this law ought not to
foreclose the States from enacting or enforcing their own laws regarding debt collection.
Accordingly, this legislation annuls only 'inconsistent' State laws, with stronger State laws
not regarded as inconsistent.") See also, § 13-11-19(2) Utah Code Ann.
Q D i r r

r^tr

AOCDC-I i A M T - D A r s r

"3. O

practices case, wherein the court had held:
"The law is not made 'for the protection of experts, but for the public — that
vast multitude which includes the ignorant, the unthinking and the
credulous, who, in making purchases, do not stop to analyze, but are
governed by appearances and general impressions'."
See also, Charles of the Ritz Dist Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission, 143 F.2d 676, 679
(2nd Cir., 1944); Jeter v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 760 F.2d 1168,1172-3 (11th Cir., 1985); Kimber
v. Federal Financial Corp., 668 F.Supp. 1480,1489 (M.D.Ala., 1987); Clomon v. Jackson, 988
F.2d 1314,131849 (2nd Cir., 1993) (same). The FTC Act as initially enacted thus prohibited
"unfair methods of competition." In 1938, Congress adopted the Wheeler-Lea Amendment,
52 Stat. I l l , which added the phrase "unfair or deceptive acts and practices" to the original
language. This was a legislative abnegation of the holding of F.T.C. v. Raladam Co., 283
U.S. 643, 51 S.Ct. 587f 75 L.Ed. 1324 (1930), restricting the coverage of the original
enactment to "protection of the public from the evils likely to result from the destruction
of competition or the restriction of it in a substantial degree..." Id. at 647, 51 S.Ct. at 590,
75 L.Ed. at 1329. In F.T.C. v. Brawn Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 321, 86 S.Ct. 1501, 1504, 16
L.Ed.2d 587, 591 (1966), a unanimous Supreme Court recognized that the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC") is endowed with "broad powers to declare trade practices unfair." The
FTC has used both its legislative and adjudicatory powers to find deceptive collection
practices unfair.

It has adopted guidelines against debt collection deception.24 This

infusion of FTC law and regulations satisfies the fundamental due process insistence "that
laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is
prohibited, so that he may act accordingly." Groyned v. Citu ofRockford, 408 U.S. 104,
108, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2299, 33 L.Ed.2d 222, 227 (1972). The constitutional adequacy of the
warning of proscribed conduct should be measured not only by common intelligence, but

16 C.F.R. Part 237. See note 28, supra.

also by "common practice." U. S. ex rel. Shottv. Tehan, 365 F.2d 191,198 (6th Cir., 1966),
cert denied, 385 U.S. 1012, 87 S.Ct. 716, 17 L.Ed.2d 548 (1967). Ordinarily, two elements
must be proved to establish a prima facie case of unfair or deceptive practices: (1) that the
defendant is engaged in trade or commerce; and (2) that in the conduct of trade or
commerce, an unfair act or practice has occurred. An act or practice is deceptive or unfair
if it has the mere capacity or tendency to deceive. F. T C v , Raladam Co., 316 U.S. 149,
152, 62 S.Ct. 966, 968, 86 L.Ed. 1336,1340 (1942). See also, Resort Car Rentals Sys.. Inc. v.
f. T. C, 518 F.2d 962, 964 (9th Cir., 1975) cert, denied sub nom., MacKensie v. U. S., 423
U.S. 827, 96 S.Ct. 41, 46 L.Ed.2d 42 (1975); Thiretv.F.
1975); Spiegel Inc. v. F.T.C

T. C, 512 F.2d 176, 180 (10th Cir.,

494 F.2d59 (7th Cir., 1974) cert, denied, 419 U.S. 869, 95 S.Ct.

175, 42 L.Ed.2d 140 (1974). An act or practice need not be "deceptive" to be "unfair."
Unfairness will be determined by a variety of factors, including:
"(1) whether the practice, without necessarily having been previously
considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by
statutes, the common law, or otherwise — whether, in other words, it is
within at least the penumbra of some common-law, statutory, or other
established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical,
oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes substantial injury to
consumers (or competitors or other businessmen)."
F. T. C. v. Sperm & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244-45 n.5, 92 S.Ct. 898, 905, n.5, 31
L.Ed.2d 170,179, n.5 (1972). Threats by debt collection agencies of imminent legal action
when no such action is actually contemplated is a deceptive act or practice. Trans World
Accounts v. F. T. C, 594 F.2d 212, 215, (9th Cir., 1979); Hearst Corp., 82 F.T.C. 951, 954
(1966). Harassment of debtors by telephone calls to them, their relatives or their employers
constitutes an unfair act or practice.

Hearst Corp., 82 F.T.C. 1792, 1797 (1973);

Neighborhood Periodical Club, In a, 81 F.T.C. 93,101 (1972). A misrepresentation by a debt
collection agency that failure to pay an alleged debt will result in impairment of one's
credit rating has been held to be an unfair and deceptive act or practice. Hearst Corp., 82

F.T.C. 1792,1797 (1973); Neighborhood

Periodical Club, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 93,101 (1972); Key

Learning Systems, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 296, 306 (1972); Book Club Guild, Inc., 65 F.T.C. 785, 790
(1964).
In more recent years the FTC Act has since been amended several times. In 1968
the Consumer Credit Protection Act ("CCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. was enacted. In
1976 Congress enacted the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1640 et seq. These
were followed by the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (1970),
and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. (1977) (Supp.
IV1980). Under the latter, the draftsmen clearly stated that "The primary persons intended
to be covered are independent debt collectors." S.Rep.No.382,95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1977),
reprinted in 1977 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News. Ibid., at 1697. See In re

Scrimpsher,

17 B.R. 999,1011 (Bkrtcy.N.D.N.Y., 1982), Id. These basic principles of consumer protection
law took on their modern formulation in the years following the FTC Act. In this regard
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
,H

In evaluating the tendency of language to deceive, the Federal Trade
Commission should look not to the most sophisticated readers but rather to
the least' Exposition Press, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 295 F.2d 869,
872 (2nd Cir., 1961). In recent years, as courts have incorporated the
jurisprudence of the FTC Act into their interpretations of the FDCPA, the
language of Exposition Press has gradually evolved into what we now know
as the least-sophisticated-consumer standard. See, e ,g. leter, 760 F.2d at 117475; Baker, 677 F.2d at 778." Clomon v. lackson, 988 F.2d 1314,1319 (2nd Cir.,
1993).
Thus has evolved the original language of Florence and its progeny relating to
"...[t]he public — that vast multitude which includes the ignorant, the unthinking and the
credulous...". See also Wright v. Credit Bureau of Georgia, Inc., 548 F.Supp. at 599; Kimber
v. Federal Financial Corp., 668 F.Supp. at 1489; Swanson,

supra, 869 F.2d 1222, 1225;

Clomon, supra, 988 F.2d at 1318-19. In Jeter, 760 F.2d at 1175, the Eleventh Circuit
concluded, in pertinent part:

"Because we believe that Congress intended the standard under the FDCPA
to be the same as that enunciated in the relevant FTC cases ... we adopt the
Exposition Press standard of least sophisticated consumer1 as previously
followed by the federal courts in Baker, supra and Bingham, supra."
This premise was based, in part, upon Jeter's reliance on the Alaska Supreme Court's
decision in State v, O'Neill Investigations, Inc, 609 P.2d 520, 530 (Alaska, 1980). In that
case the court disagreed with O'Neill's contention that "...[t]he recent enactment of the
federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act,... which specifically prohibits all false, deceptive,
misleading, unfair or harassing collection practices, is evidence that such practices were not
prohibited by prior federal law." In answer to this contention the Alaskan Court said:
"This claim ignores the new rights and remedies created by the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act: consumers now have a private right of action against
creditors unavailable under the Federal Trade Commission Act. The new act
expands already existing Federal Trade Commission jurisdiction over unfair
or deceptive acts and practices of collection agencies; it is not written on a
clean slate. The Federal Trade Commission's prior exercise of jurisdiction in
this area is entitled to great weight, U. S. v. Shrevepart Grain & Elevator Co.,
287 U.S. 77, 84, 53 S.Ct. 42, 44, 77 L.Ed. 175, 179 (1932), and leads to the
conclusion that the new Act merely supplements the [FTC Act]...", (emphasis
in original.)
In deciding a case of first impression under the FDCPA, the Supreme Court of
Wyoming observed that primary enforcement for violations of the Act continued to be
vested in an aggrieved debtor, as was the case in the Truth in Lending Act, rather than in
the Federal Trade Commission as before:
"Administrative enforcement of the FDCPA is assigned to the Federal Trade
Commission, 15 U.S.C § 1692/, but the primary enforcement, in order to
eliminate the objectionable practices, is self-enforcement by the aggrieved
debtor acting as a 'private attorney general' through a civil action like that
initiated by Johnson. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k; Zimmerman, Staub, Riveria; Westv.
Costen, 558 F.Supp. 564 (W.D.Va., 1983)." Johnson v. Statewide Collections,
Inc., 778 P.2d 93, 99 (Wyo., 1989).
See also, Wright v. Collection Bureau of Georgia, Inc., 548 F.Supp. 591,593 (N.D.Ga., 1982)
("The FDCPA, like many other consumer protection acts, is 'primarily self-enforcing'");
McGawan v. King, Inc, 569 F.2d 845,848 (5th Cir., 1976) ("Scheme of Truth in Lending Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq., is 'to create a system of private attorneys general to aid its
enforcement"'); Whatley, etal, v. Universal Collection Bureau, Inc, 525 F.Supp. 1204,1206
DpMfi-
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(N.D.Ga., 1981) ("...Congress created a piece of consumer protection legislation with a
'private attorneys general1 enforcement mechanism,...").
In reaching its determinations in Johnson, supra, the Wyoming Supreme Court had
previously considered as follows:
"We must then consider the merits of the several asserted grounds for
recovery under the FDCPA. Congress adopted this legislation in 1977 to
protect consumers from abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection
activities by eliminating certain offensive and unethical practices in vogue
with many third-party debt collectors. Zimmerman v. HBO Affiliate Group,
834 F.2d 1163 (3rd Cir., 1987); Staub v. Harris, 626 F.2d 275, 62 A.L.RFed. 544
(3rd Cir., 1980); Riveria v. MAB Collections, Inc., 682 F.Supp. 174 (W.D.N.Y.,
1988). ... The objectionable practices, still prevalent even after the adoption
of the FDCPA, often are exacerbated because independent collectors generally
are unconcerned with the consumer's opinion of them, or their own
reputations in the eyes of the public, and they proceed accordingly. ...
Because the goal of the FDCPA is to eliminate abusive collection practices it
is applicable whether or not a valid debt exists. Baker v. G. C. Services Corp.,
677 F.2d 775 (9th Cir., 1982). ... Standing is afforded an aggrieved consumer
to proceed under the act as long as the collector was purporting to attempt
to collect an alleged debt In a report from the subcommittee, its chairman
said, 'every individual, whether or not he owes the debt, has the right to be
treated in a reasonable and civil manner.' 123 Cong.Rec. 10241 (1977); Baker,
677 F.2d at 777 r Johnson, supra, 77S P.2d at 98-99. (emphasis added.)
Another provision of the FDCPA that is particularly relevant to the instant case on
appeal is that set forth at 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) which provides:
"(b) Disputed debts. If the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing
within the thirty-day period described in subsection (a) of this section that the
debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, or that the consumer requests the

name and address of the original creditor, the debt collector SHALL cease
collection of the debt, or any disputed portion tfiereof UNTIL the debt
collector obtains verification of the debtor a copy of a judgment, or the name
and address of the original creditor, and a COPY of such verification or
judgment, or name and address of the original creditor, IS MAILED TO THE
CONSUMER BY THE DEBT COLLECTOR." (Emphasis added.)
This provision of the FDCPA requires the verification, or validation, of the alleged
debt in order to prevent collection activities from being directed against the wrong person
or against a debtor who has paid. Johnson, supra, 77% P.2d at 100; Swanson, supra, 869
F.2d at 1225; Staubf supra, 626 F.2d at 277; Riveria, supra, 682 F.Supp. 174. In the instant

case, Plaintiff submitted to Defendant its initial communication (hereinafter "Initial
Communication"), dated 8 May 1991, in connection with its assignment of the alleged debt,
seeking a "Total Due" of $4,126.64.25 By return letter, dated 15 May 1991, Defendant duly
notified Plaintiff of three specific items: (1) that the debt was disputed; (2) that verification
of the debt was requested; and (3) to cease communications except for providing the
requested verification.26 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c). Plaintiff, however, persisted in mailing to
Defendant dunning notices of varying amounts 27 and engaging in telephone harassment
of Defendant throughout 1991, notwithstanding its admitted acknowldegment of the
contents of Defendant's 15 May 1991 letter to cease and desist, 28 each of which
communications thereafter constituted a separate violation of the FDCPA. 15 U.S.C. §
1692c(c); Wright v. Credit Bureau of Georgia, Inc., 548 F.Supp. 591, 594 (N.D.Ga., 1982).
That was harassment 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(5); Bingham v. Collection Bureau, Inc., 505 F.Supp.
864, 873 (D.N.D., 1981). Nevertheless, on or about 27 July 1992, Plaintiff filed the action
now on appeal here seeking $3,976.64. One month later, on or about 27 August 1992,
Plaintiffs Assignor also mailed to Defendant a dunning notice seeking $5,162.77,29
notwithstanding the amount sought in Plaintiffs complaint and further notwithstanding

25

See Defendant's Counterclaim, "Exhibit A."

26

"Exhibit B." Ibid. See also Record Transcript, p. 11, lines 1-5, and paragraphs 24-25
of Defendant's counterclaim (p. 12).
27

See Counterclaim Exhibits "C-l," "C-2," "D-l," "D-2," "D-3" and "E." See also, R.T.,
p. 94, lines 2-5: "Mr. Mulliner: And we admit we sent those documents. We deny that
those documents in any way violate the Act and I take it that that's your ruling, that they
don't violate the Act."
28

See Plaintiffs Answers to Request For Admissions (2nd Set) and Production of
Documents, dated 25 October 1994, request #68.
29

See Counterclaim Exhibit "J." At trial, Plaintiff, noting the obvious incorrectness of
this amount, stated: "There are some numbers that will have to be backed out." (R.T., p.
24, lines 9-17.)
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its assignment of the alleged debt to Plaintiff some sixteen (16) months earlier.30 On or
about 23 November 1992, Defendant mailed to Plaintiff, this time by certified mail, a
second cease and desist letter again notifying Plaintiff inter alia to cease all attempts to
collect the alleged debt and to withdraw its filed action.31 Although Plaintiff admitted on
discovery that it acknowledged the plain language contained in Defendant's notice of 15
May 1991, Plaintiff nevertheless failed to comply with Defendant's request which was duly
made within the statutory 30-day period. Plaintiff, however, denied such failure,32 but
offered no proof to the contrary, nor is there any evidentiary support in the record other
than Plaintiffs naked denial in this material respect. In light of Plaintiffs acknowledgment
of the subject matter of Defendant's 15 May 1991 letter, as published in the record, and the
court having been so advised at trial, 33 it was clear error for the court thereafter to find
that Defendant had failed to prove "by a preponderance of the evidence" that she had a
cause of action under the FDCPA and, subsequently, the UCSPA. Sorenson v. KennecottUtah Copper Corp., 873 P.2d 1141,1147 (Ut.Ct.App., 1994) (findings are clearly erroneous
if they are against clear weight of evidence or if appellate court reaches definite and firm
conviction that mistake has been made). Moreover, to the extent the record fails to reflect
any evidence whatsoever that Plaintiff complied with Defendant's written request for
verification of the alleged debt, under § 1692g(b) Plaintiff was statutorily barred from
further attempts to pxirsue collection thereof upon and after its receipt of Defendant's 15

30

Counsel stated assignment occurred on 25 April 1991. (R.T., p. 22, lines 17-18.)
Exhibit A, however, affixed the alleged amount due as of 8 May 1991 at $4,126.64.
31

See Counterclaim Exhibits "H" and "I."

32

See Plaintiffs Answers to Request For Admissions (2nd Set) and Production of
Documents, Ibid., #69.
33

See R.T., p. 11, lines 1-5.

May 1991 letter until such time as it complied with the provisions of the statute owing to
the use of the mandatory form of the word "shall." See Johnson, supra, 778 P.2d at 100,
where the Wyoming Supreme court makes this point crystal clear:
"It was CheckRite's duty, under the statute, to cease collection activities on
the date it received the letter from Johnson's counsel until it sent Johnson,
through his counsel, verification of the alleged debt. Staub.
The
congressional intent is plain and no other meaning can possibly be imposed
for this portion of the statute. [ ] The mandatory form of the word 'shall* is
used in the statute. ... Federal precedent suggests that fin construing a statute
we are obliged to give effect, * * *, to every word Congress used.' Reiter v.
Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 2331, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979);
Baker, 677 F.2d at 778. Application of that concept to this statute manifests
an implicit requirement that the verification furnished from the creditor be
in writing because the statute also requires that a copy of the verification be
mailed to the consumer. (Wyo. cites omitted.) With that implicit
requirement, an oral validation of a debt is not sufficient to comply with the
FDCPA." (Emphasis added.)
In the instant case, not even an oral validation of the alleged debt was provided to
Defendant by Plaintiff, much less in writing as the statute commands. Only on 28 October
1994, or nearly 3-1/2 years after its acknowledgment of Defendant's 15 May 1991 request,
and then only after being compelled through discovery, did Plaintiff provide to Defendant
copies of dociunents purporting to be "verification" of the alleged debt — the conflicting
amounts notwithstanding. Where the record reflects that such documents were included
in the original assignment to Plaintiff on or about 25 April 1991, Plaintiffs failure to
comply with Defendant's request was done knowingly and wilfully, and with intentional
disregard of this mandatory duty. 34
34

Exhibit A makes specific reference to this provision of the FDCPA where the second
paragraph states:
"Public Law 95-109, Section 809 [15 U.S.C. §1692g] requires you to be
notified that unless the validity of this debt, or any portion thereof referred
to by this letter is disputed within thirty days of receipt of this notice, this
debt is assumed to be valid. If you notify" the AUDIT & ACCOUNTING
AUTHORITY in writing within thirty days that this debt, or any portion
thereof, is disputed we will provide you with verification of the debt or
judgment."
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More importantly, however, where Plaintiffs failure to comply with the plain
mandate of the statute absolutely prohibited its further collection attempts until compliance
was met, it necessarily follows that such prohibition, likewise, precluded Plaintiffs standing
to sue in this case, as Plaintiffs action cannot be reasonably construed as anything other
than an illegal attempt to enforce prohibited collection in light of the admitted facts.
Standing, being jurisdictional in nature, must be proven when challenged and may be
raised at any time, including for the first time on appeal. The facts and admissions in this
case clearly establish the want of jurisdiction on the grounds just shown and the same is,
therefore, fatal to Plaintiffs case. Accordingly, the judgment is required to be vacated as
void, as a matter of law.
Notwithstanding this fatal jurisdictional defect and bar against Plaintiffs further
collection attempts, Defendant's counterclaim exhibits conclusively prove that Plaintiff
continued to engage in proscribed communications with Defendant thereafter by both mail
and telephone, each of which incidents constituted a separate violation of the FDCPA.
Wright supra, 548 F.Supp. 591, 594; Bingham, supra, 505 F.Supp. 864, 871-874. In the
pubHshed exhibits, and at trial, Plaintiff admitted mailing such documents, although it also
denied that such mailings violated the Act. (See footnote #27, ante., p. 38.) Plaintiff failed,
however, to offer any proof in support of this bare, conclusory assertion, offering only as
follows:
"We deny that those documents in any way violate the Act and I take it that
that's your ruling, that they don't violate the Act." Ibid.
Being persuaded by this naked assertion notwithstanding Defendant's evidence to the
contrary, the court, without more, ruled against Defendant nevertheless.
Plaintiffs Initial Communication also violated the FDCPA in a number of other
significant ways. First, Defendant's counterclaim alleged that Exhibit A constituted a false

or misleading representation in that it contained the both the name "Audit & Accounting
Authority, Ltd., and the name and logo of "ATTORNEYS Credit Service" as the most
predominant visual effect on the form, thus misleading Defendant, as "the least
sophisticated consumer," into believing that Plaintiffs communication involved attorneys
in some respect. 35 Plaintiff also denied this allegation, albeit in circuitous fashion:
"Mr. Mulliner: WeVe admitted mailing certain documents, that's correct,
Your Honor. We deny that they say to use a name, which isn't registered
with the state, by the way, licensed, bonded, Attorneys Credit Services
misleads anybody into thinking that a letter is from an attorney when it
doesn't purport to be signed by an attorney, doesn't have an attorney's
letterhead or anything like that." (R. T., p. 88, lines 10-16.)
While Plaintiffs argument here does much to establish its cognizance that debt
collection is a regulated industry; that Plaintiff is an entity organized and existing under
the laws of this State; and that it is engaged in the business of collecting debts, under
assignment, from creditors 36 - all of which clearly subjects Plaintiff to the provisions of the
Act — nevertheless, its bare, unsupported denial fails to establish any proof how it's forms
are not misleading to "the least sophisticated consumer" in light of the decisional law under
the Act conclusively establishing such violations.

Accordingly, to the extent this

predominant wording appearing on the face of the form tended to mislead Defendant into
believing that attorneys were somehow involved, this practice is soundly proscribed by the
FDCPA. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(3), (13). See Johnson, 778 P.2d at 103:
"As the statute has been applied, even though a debt collector uses its true
name, that name still may violate the FDCPA if it has a likelihood of
deceiving or misleading the consumer. Wright 548 F.Supp. 591. The use of
a name, even though truly and appropriately belonging to the collector, that
either states or implies that the collector is something that in fact it is not is

35

See Defendant's Counterclaim, para. 28, p. 13.

36

See State v. O'Neill Investigations, Inc., 609 P.2d at 524-25; Wright v. Collection
Bureau of Georgia, Inc. 548 F.Supp. at 900; Riveria, 682 F.Supp. at 176; Johnson, 77S P.2d
at 103. Ibid.
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a clear violation of the spirit of the statute even though arguably within the
letter of the law. If the name would cause the least sophisticated consumer'
to erroneously believe that the entity was a governmental agency or a law
office, the use of the name could violate this provision even though it was the
correct name for the debt collector.1'
Also see Bingham, 505 F.Supp. at 870; Wright v. Collection Bureau of Georgia, Inc, 548
F.Supp. at 600 [9]. In Wright the court stated:
"Since the appropriate standard is an objective one, the tendency of the
defendants1 statements to deceive is not determined by the fact that Ms.
Wright may have been deceived into thinking that she was dealing directly
with a consumer reporting agency. Rather, the court must determine for
itself whether an unsophisticated consumer on the low side of reasonable
capacity1 would have been deceived. Applying that standard, the court holds
that the letters sent by CBI to Ms. Wright violated section 1692e)."
Concurring with the rationale expressed in Wright and other federal cases, the opinion
rendered in Johnson, supra, sheds further light and instruction on this point:
"Perhaps Johnson was perceptive enough not to be deceived by this notice,
but CheckRite's argument demonstrates a type of abuse sought to be
eliminated by the FDCPA. Furthermore, its contention ignores the rule that
this act is to be construed to the benefit of the least sophisticated debtor.1
Swanson, 869 F.2d 1222; Jeter v. Credit Bureau, Inc, 760 F.2d 1168 (11th Or.,
1985); Kimberv. Federal Finance Corporation, 668 F.Supp. 1480 (M.D.Ala.,
1987). See Baker, 677 F.Supp. 370; Wright [supra], Checkrite's argument with
respect to the impact upon Johnson is not material, and CheckRite has not
chosen to address the impact of its notice upon the least sophisticated of
debtors. To avoid this precise dilemma, Congress wisely chose to require
debt collectors to regulate themselves by the maintenance of procedures
adapted to avoid such errors as that demonstrated in this case." Johnson v.
Statewide Collections, Inc, 778 P.2d at 102.
At trial, however, the court wholly misconstrued Defendant's attempt to show how
Plaintiffs forms tended to be misleading and violative of the Act where, without more, it
summarily dismissed the matter by concluding as follows:
"The ones that I have dealt with sanctions and things involving people who
represent themselves to be attorneys who want to be, that sort of thing. If
the letter was signed by a Mr. John Jones, attorney at law, I mean that's not -". (R.T., p. 88, lines 17-21.)
Secondly, Plaintiffs Initial Communication further violated the FDCPA where,

although it contained a provision notifying Defendant of the thirty-day period in which to
request verification of the alleged debt, that notification is misleading where it also specifies
not only one, but two (2) additional conflicting time provisions in which to pay the alleged
debt: (i) "...[m]ust now be paid upon receipt of this notice," and (ii) "You must remit
payment to this office within seven (7) days...". Courts deciding this particular issue have
consistently found that such conflict in terms does not effectively communicate to "the least
sophisticated consumer" the statutory right to thirty days in which to request verification
of an alleged debt. Ostv. Collection Bureau, Inc., 493 F.Supp. 701,702 (D.N.D., 1980) ("The
'communication1 to the consumer, therefore, is that he has five days in which to pay the
alleged debt or face some further 'proceeding' by the debt collector.

Since the Act

specifically gives the consumer thirty days in which to dispute the validity of that debt, the
language on the front of Collection Bureau, Inc.'s form is, at best, misleading"); Riveria, 682
F.Supp. at 177; Genusov. Commercial Bank & Trust Co., 566 F.2d 437, 443 (3rd Cir., 1977)
(disclosure of terms shall not be stated, utilized, or placed so as to mislead or confuse
consumers; placement of disclosures is to be considered along with their statement and
use); Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107, 111 (3rd Cir., 1991) (notice of right to respond
within thirty days is not effectively communicated when presented in conjunction with
contradictory demand for payment within ten days); see also, Swanson, supra, 869 F.2d at
1225 (9th Cir., 1988) (same). Plaintiffs Initial Communication was thus further violative
of the Act.
In sum, the documentary evidence published in this case clearly shows that Plaintiff
violated the provisions of the FDCPA in numerous ways. As the court was bound to take
judicial notice of the statute, due process was thus violated in several respects, including,
but not limited to: (i) relying upon Plaintiffs naked assertions in ruling that Plaintiffs
actions "don't violate the Act;" (ii) by refusing to refer to Defendant's counterclaim and

exhibits during trial; (iii) by having Defendant's Counsel "...[jjust give me a Reader's Digest
[version]" of the acts alleged to be violative of the FDCPA, rather than being permitted to
call witnesses to be directly examined on these issues; (iv) by declaring as "res judicata" a
further violative communication sent by Plaintiff to Defendant only after trial had been set
in this matter and holding the same not to be a part of Defendant's counterclaim,
notwithstanding the court's prior acknowledgment of Defendant's letter of 15 May 1991
advising Plaintiff to cease communications; and (v) ultimately accepting Plaintiffs
conclusory "findings of facts" in these respects as constituting a "preponderance of the
evidence" that Defendant had failed to establish that she had a cause of action under the
FDCPA and the UCSPA. Thus, Defendant was deprived of due process as the proximate
result of the court's fundamental misconception of the nature and purpose of the FDCPA.
Federal precedent is equally instructive in clarifying errors such as these. In dealing with
"initial communication" violations such as the one at issue here, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals, in holding such notice as violative of the Act, critically reviewed the actions
of a federal magistrate and the district court in these terms:
"The magistrate, whose findings were adopted without revision or comment
by the district court, termed Swanson's argument 'frivilous,' concluding that
'[njothing in the notice can reasonably be construed as threatening [Swanson]
with adverse consequences.' This conclusion is patently at odds with the
tenor and text of the notice itself. The reference to the undefined 'master file,'
juxtaposed with the admonition that Swanson's credit rating was his 'most
valuable asset,' cannot reasonably be interpreted as anything but a threat: if
Swanson did not pay within 10 days, his name would be placed in Southern
Oregon's 'master file' and as a result he would lose his 'most valuable asset.'
"The magistrate's conclusion demonstrates a fundamental misconception of
the nature of section 1692g. The statute is not satisfied merely by inclusion
of the required debt validation notice; the notice Congress required must be
conveyed effectively to the debtor. ... Furthermore, to be effective, the notice
must not be overshadowed or contradicted by other messages or notices
appearing in the initial communication from the collection agency. E,g,,
Thomas v. National Business Assistants, Inc., No. N82-469 (D.Conn., Oct. 5,
1984) ('inconspicuous and grossly overshadowed' notice did 'not properly
notify recipients of their validation of debt rights') (cites omitted)." Swanson
v. Southern Oregon Credit Service, Inc., 869 F.2d at 1225 (9th Cir., 1988).

The "fundamental misconception" syndrome was similarly demonstrated by the trial
court in this case where it had also stated:
"...[b]ut there's nothing in here that jumps u p and down and says that your
client was misled or made some payments or was browbeaten to do anything.
She certainly wasn't browbeaten into anything,..." (R.T., p. 93, lines 17-20.)
Thus the court completely misconstrued its adjudicative duty so clearly pointed out in
Johnson, supra, that "...[t]he court must determine for itself whether an unsophisticated
consumer on the low side of reasonable capacity* would have been deceived," rather than
simply finding, without more, that "nothing" in Defendant's counterclaim "jumps u p and
down and says that" Defendant was "misled... or was browbeaten into anything." Indeed,
Defendant's counterclaim does not say that. Rather, it clearly alleges, fully supported by
documentary evidence, numerous violations of the Act committed by Plaintiff during the
pendency of this action that courts, both federal and state, trial and appellate, have
repeatedly and consistently held to be violations over the past eighteen years since the Act
was passed. Even the envelopes Plaintiff used to communicate with Defendant by use of
the mails were violative of the Act where they facially demonstrate "symbols" and language
other than Plaintiff s address. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(8). In deciding just such a case the South
Carolina Court of Appeals, in reversing a summary judgment, cited this provision of the
FDCPA and stated:
"An unfair practice includes the use of 'any language or symbol, other than
the debt collector's address, on any envelope when communicating with a
consumer by use of the mails ..., except that a debt collector may use his
business name if such name does not indicate that he is in the debt collection
business." Phillips v. Periodical Publishers1 Service Bureau, Inc., supra, 369
S.E.2d 154, 156 (S.C.App., 1988).
On this point during trial, the following brief discussion ensued wherein Plaintiff clearly
acknowledged that it is in the collection business, as evidenced by the symbol and
language on it's mailing envelopes clearly stating ATTORNEYS CREDIT SERVICE:
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"Mr. Stanton: Alleging or giving the innuendo that they are collecting for
attorneys or that they are attorneys.
Mr. Mulliner: Put it back. They do collect for attorneys and I don't think
that represents that they are attorneys." (R.T., p. 88, lines 12-16.)
In this regard the court, again, demonstrated its fundamental misconception of the Act
where it stated as follows:
"And looking at some egregious sort of behavior with respect to agencies
and maybe I've become desensitized because maybe, you know, having on
your letterhead if it says Attorneys' Service or something, maybe I'm not
reading it correctly, Mr. Stanton, but I am reading that they're providing a
service to interpret Attorney's Credit Service. I don't read that as being
threatening toward Billie Murdock or saying that we have big shot lawyers
who are going to sue you when they really don't." (R.T., pp. 91-91, lines 2225 and 1-5, respectively.)
But, as was held in Johnson and Wright supras, the court is not charged with the duty to
"read that as being threatening," rather, the court must determine for itself whether an
unsophisticated consumer on the 'low side of reasonable capacity," would have been
deceived by the symbol and language on Plaintiffs envelopes as well as the contents
thereof — even if it is Plaintiffs correct name.
Moreover, under the FDCPA statutory damages are available merely on proof of a
violation, as no proof of actual damages need be established. Such was stated by the Ninth
Circuit in Baker as follows:
"Further, the Act's damage provisions are very similar to those under the
Truth in Lending Act (ULA), 15 U.S.C § 1640(a). Under TILA, statutory
damages are available merely on proof of a violation; no proof of actual
damages is required. Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U.S.
356,376-77,93 S.Ct. 1652,1664-65,36 L.Ed.2d 318 (1973); Dzadauskuv. Lyons
Ford Sales, Inc., 593 F.2d 538 539, (3rd Cir., 1979); Gennuso v. Commercial
Bank & Trust Co., 566 F.2d 437, 443 (3rd Cir., 1977)." Cf, Baker v. G. C.
Services Corp., 677 F.2d 778, 780 [11] (9th Cir., 1982).
In sum, each and every contact Plaintiff made with Defendant after 15 May 1991
constituted a violation of the Act as the proximate result of its failure to abide by the
provisions thereof where Defendant, as the 'least sophisticated consumer" acting as a

"private attorney general," had exercised her statutory right to request that Plaintiff cease
further communications except to provide her with verification of the alleged debt, which
Plaintiff clearly did not do; nor could it in light of the aftermath of trial.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons expressed herein, the judgment rendered as against Defendant
should be reversed with an award of costs and a reasonable attorney's fee.
Respectfully submitted this the 15th day of September, 1995.
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